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The Prototype Gen IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) has been developed for the last 4
years, fulfilling the technology demonstration of the burning capability of transuranic el-
ements included in light water reactor spent nuclear fuel. The PGSFR design has been
focused on the robustness of safety systems by enhancing inherent safety characteristics
of metal fuel and strengthening passive safety features using natural circulation and
thermal expansion. The preliminary safety information document as a major outcome of
the first design phase of PGSFR development was issued at the end of 2015. The project
entered the second design phase at the beginning of 2016. This paper summarizes the
overall structures, systems, and components of nuclear steam supply system and safety
characteristics of the PGSFR. The research and development activities to demonstrate the
safety performance are also briefly introduced in the paper.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The light water reactor (LWR) has been operated and has
played a significant role of a stable electricity supply and in
economic growth in Korea since 1978. There are 22 LWRs and
four CANDU type reactors currently in operation, four pres-
surized water cooled reactors (PWRs) under construction and
four additional PWRs planned by 2029 based upon the 7th
National Electricity Demand and Supply Plan. The construc-
tion of the nuclear power plant also supports the Paris
Agreement on new climate change agreed at United Nations).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncClimate Change Conference (COP21) in 2015 and the 2nd Na-
tional Basic Energy Plan, which targets a nuclear share of 29%
by 2035.
One serious obstacle in constructing an LWR is a problem
with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management because of high
radiotoxicity and long half-life of SNF. Annually, about 760
tons of SNF are discharged from PWRs and the total stored
SNF amounted to14,468 tons as of December 2015. In this
context, the Public Engagement Commission on Spent Nu-
clear Fuel made 10 recommendations on future SNF man-
agement policy in 2015. One of the key recommendations is tolf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
Table 1 e Top tier design requirements of Prototype Gen
IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR).
Parameters Requirements
General requirement Demonstration of TRU burning
capability and fully closed fuel
cycle with pyro-processing
technology
Fuel U-10% Zr fuel for initial core
U-TRU-Zr fuel for final
equilibrium core
Power More than 150 MWe
Outlet temperature More than 545C
(Thermal efficiency ~ 40%)
Design life time
and capacity factor
60 yr and more than 75% average
capacity factor
Safe shutdown earthquake 0.3 g (seismically isolated)
Core damage frequency Less than 106/reactor-yr
Operator grace period More than 2 hr
SBO coping time More than 72 hr
SBO, station black out; TRU, transuranics.
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and toxicity reduction of SNF.
The SNF problem has been a common concern among
countries which have utilized nuclear energy for a long time
or have a plan to extend the utilization of nuclear energy. A
sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) has been widely recognized
as a technical alternative to effectivelymanage the SNF, owing
to its transmutation capability of long lived radiotoxic nu-
clides included in the SNF. It can be accomplished by using
abundant high energy excessive neutrons in the core. For this
reason, the SFR development plan is always accompanied
with the policy for the extension of nuclear energy in many
countries.
The long term development plan for the future nuclear
energy systems was authorized by the Korean Atomic Energy
Commission in 2008 and updated in 2011; it includes a con-
struction of a prototype SFR by 2028, with preparation of a
preliminary safety information document by 2015, issue of a
specific design safety analysis report by 2017, and its approval
by 2020.
The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has
been developing SFR design technologies since 1997 under a
national nuclear R&D program. The goals of the SFR design
technology development project were to secure strategic key
technologies and to develop the conceptual design of a SFR,
which are necessary for an efficient utilization of uranium
resources and a reduction of a high level waste volume and
toxicity. To this end, conceptual designs of KALIMER-150,
breakeven core design of KALIMER-1200, and the trans-
uranics (TRU) burner of KALIMER-600 have been completed as
the main outcomes of those studies [1,2].
The national project to develop the Prototype Gen IV so-
dium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) was initiated to achieve the
national mission stated above in 2012. For this, the Sodium
Cooled Fast Reactor Development Agency dedicated to the
PGSFR development was established in the middle of 2012.
R&D works of the PGSFR project are mainly carried out by
KAERI, KEPCO E&C, and Doosan Heavy Industry. KAERI is in
charge of the design and the validation of the nuclear steam
supply system and fuel development, and KEPCO E&C is
responsible for balance of the plant system design. Doosan
Heavy Industry is involved in the evaluation of a mechanical
design and fabrication of major components. KAERI is closely
working with Argonne National Laboratory under an agree-
ment on the joint development program approved as a work-
for-others contract. Argonne National Laboratory supports
KAERI with their experiences in SFR development and is
jointly working on the developments of codes for fuel rod
performance analysis and severe accident analysis.
The first design phase of the PGSFR was completed at the
end of 2015 and the second phase of the development was
entered at the beginning of 2016 [3]. All of the basic design
concepts of structures, systems and components were deter-
mined and incorporated into the preliminary safety informa-
tion document [4,5], which includes basic design
requirements and system descriptions and the results of
safety analysis for representative accident scenarios.
This paper summarizes the PGSFR design and its safety
characteristics performed in the first design phase of PGSFR.
Other papers on the safety analysis results of PGSFR, themetalfuel development and its verification, and the safety and
performance tests for the PGSFR will be published separately
with this paper. Duplicated contents of those papers are
briefly introduced in this paper.2. System descriptions of the PGSFR
2.1. Top-tier design requirements and general
descriptions
The main goal of the PGSFR development is to demonstrate
transmutation capability of TRU which are major long-lived
radiotoxic elements included in the LWR SNF. A high level of
safety and efficient electricity generation are also re-
quirements of the PGSFR. The major items of top tier re-
quirements of PGSFR are listed in Table 1.
The PGSFR is a pool-type having two intermediate heat
transport system (IHTS) loops with two steam generators
(SGs) and its electrical capacity is 150MWe. The PGSFR is a fast
neutron spectrum reactor and uses liquid sodiumas a coolant.
The core generates nuclear heat of 392.2 MWt and is loaded
with metal fuels of U-Zr in the initial core and of U-TRU-Zr in
the final equilibrium core. All of the structures, systems, and
components of the primary heat transport system (PHTS) are
contained in the reactor vessel. The system operates under
atmospheric pressure so that there is no possibility of high
pressure release by pipe breaks, unlike in loop-type LWRs. The
large sodium inventory inside the reactor vessel provides a
large thermal inertia which relieves a thermal transient and
allows a relatively longer grace period in an accident
condition.
The initial core of the PGSFR is loaded with low enriched
uranium metal fuel (U-10% Zr) for a system performance
demonstration and as a test bed for TRU fuel irradiation as
shown in Table 2. Several lead test rods and lead test assem-
blies containing TRU fuel made of recycled from LWR SNF
(LWR-TRU) will be loaded and qualified during this period.
Table 2 e Evolution of Prototype Gen IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) core.
U core (initial) LTRU core (mid-term) MTRU core (final)
 U-10%Zr fuel
 Open fuel cycle
 LWR-TRU (LTRU) afuel demonstration
 LTR and LTA test zone installation
 U-TRU-Zr fuel
 LWR-TRU equilibrium
 Open fuel cycle
 LWR-TRU and self TRU mixed (MTRU)b
fuel demonstration
 U-TRU-Zr fuel
 TRU core equilibrium with self-recycling þ LWR
recycling (MTRU fuel equilibrium)
a LTRU ¼ TRU recycled from LWR SNF.
b MTRU ¼ mixed TRU with self-recycled TRU þ LTRU.
LTA, lead test assembly; LTR, lead test rod; LWR, light water reactor.
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loaded into the core batch-by-batch. Until this stage, the back
end fuel cycle will be kept as once-through without self-
recycling. The in-reactor performance of the mixed TRU
with self-recycled TRU fuel (MTRU) will also be demonstrated
during the light water cooled reactor TRU (LTRU) core opera-
tion. Finally, the fully closed fuel cycle with the self-recycling
will be demonstrated in the MTRU core.
Fig. 1 shows the key design features and schematic dia-
gram of the PGSFR. A total of 217 fuel rods are arranged in a
triangular configuration within fuel subassembly. A total of
112 fuel subassemblies are loaded into the core in the hex-
agonal configuration. The active core height is about 90 cm.
The cycle length of uranium equilibrium core is about 290
effective full power days. There is neither an axial blanket nor
radial blanket to prevent excessive TRU production in the
blanket region. The active core is directly faced into the steel
reflector without a blanket.Fig. 1 e Key design features of the Prototype Gen IV sodium coo
system; CR, control rod; CRDM, control rod drivingmechanism; D
day; EVTM, ex-vessel transfer machine; DHX, decay heat excha
system; IHX, intermediate heat exchanger; IVTM, in-vessel tran
PHTS, primary heat transport system; RV, reactor vessel; SG, st
relief system.The PHTS of the PGSFR is a pool type. All of the structures
and components of the PHTS, four intermediate heat ex-
changers (IHXs) and two mechanical pumps are submerged
into a large sodium pool confined by double vessels: reactor
vessel and containment vessel. The IHTS consists of two loops
with two SGs. An annular linear induction pump is used in the
IHTS. A sodium-water reaction pressure relief system
(SWRPRS) is connected to the IHTS pipes to prevent over-
pressure of IHTS loops and IHX tubes when the sodium-
water reaction occurs in the SG. The IHTS pipes inside
containment are double-walled. The gap between inner and
outer pipes, as well as the gap between the reactor and
containment vessels is filled with inert gas and continuously
monitored by diverse leak detectors.
The decay heat is rejected to the atmosphere by the decay
heat removal system (DHRS). The DHRS consists of four trains:
two active DHRSs (ADHRSs) and two passive DHRSs (PDHRSs).
The sodium to air heat exchangers are a finned tube type forled fast reactor (PGSFR). ADHRS, active decay heat removal
HRS, decay heat removal system; EFPD, effective full power
nger; GV, guard vessel; IHTS, intermediate heat transport
sfer machine; PDHRS, passive decay heat removal system;
eam generator; SWRPRS, sodium-water reaction pressure
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 0 5 9e1 0 7 01062the ADHRSs and a helical coil type for the PDHRSs. Active
functions of ADHRSs are provided by a DC conduction pump
and an air blower. The active circuit has also a passive func-
tion by natural circulation of sodium and air. The passive heat
removal capacity of the active circuit is more than 50% of
designed heat removal capacity when the pump and blower
are not operable.
The PGSFR has an independent and diversified safety
shutdown system which consists of six primary control rods
and three secondary shutdown rods. A passive shutdown
mechanism is applied to the secondary shutdown rods for
additional shutdown capability during beyond design basis
accidents.
2.2. Fuel and reactor core
The PGSFR has a radially homogeneous core configuration
which comprises annular rings of driver fuel subassemblies.
As shown in Fig. 2, the reactor core consists of 52 inner fuel
subassemblies, 60 outer fuel subassemblies, nine control as-
semblies, 90 reflector assemblies, and 102 B4C shield assem-
blies. The active core height is 90.0 cm and the radial
equivalent diameter of uranium core including control as-
semblies is 157.5 cm. The fuel enrichment of two fuel zones is
identically 19.2 wt.% of U-235 during the uranium equilibrium
core, but the refueling schemes are different in four batch
refueling for inner fuel subassemblies and five batch refueling
for outer fuel subassemblies.
Major core and fuel subassembly design parameters are
given in Table 3. The fuel form is U-10% Zr metallic fuel for
initial core, and the fuel will be replaced by U-TRU-Zr
ternary alloy in connection with pyroprocessing of LWR SNF.
The gap between fuel slug and cladding is bonded by so-
dium. The fuel cladding material has been chosen to be FC92
to improve high temperature strength and creep resistance.
A fission gas plenum of 125 cm is located above the fuel slugEq. diameter = 253 cm
Eq. diameter = 158 cm
Fig. 2 e Radial layout of the Prototype Gen IVand sodium bond. Block type reflectors are located above
and below the fuel bundle for axial neutron shielding, 50 cm
and 90 cm for upper and lower reflectors in thickness,
respectively.
The assembly pitch is 13.54 cm. Each driver fuel subas-
sembly consists of 217 fuel rods and the fuel has smeared
density of 75% to accommodate the fuel thermal expansion
and irradiation swelling. The schematic diagram of the fuel
rod and fuel subassembly is shown in Fig. 3. In the equilibrium
cycle of uranium fueled core, the refueling interval is 12
months of operation and one-fourth or one-fifth of the driver
fuel subassemblies are replaced during each outage. The fuel
subassemblies are not shuffled, and remain in the same po-
sition over the entire cycles. Following removal from the core,
they are to be stored for decay in in-vessel storage (IVS)
positions.
Reactivity control for normal operations of startup, load
change, and shutdown is accomplished by manipulation of
the control rod system in the core. The control rod system
consists of the primary and secondary control systems. The
primary and secondary control systems contain six and three
control rod assemblies, respectively. Two independent and
diverse shutdown systems are provided for ensuring safe
shutdown of the reactor, even when one system is not avail-
able. Both systems are designed to shut down the reactor
within 2 s. In addition, the secondary control system utilizes
the passive shutdown, which is automatically operated by
thermal expansion when the hot pool temperature increases
to the specific value.
Core neutronics performance parameters for the uranium
equilibrium cycle are summarized in Table 4. The U-235
enrichment at the equilibrium state is about 19.2 wt.%
throughout fuel subassemblies. The average discharge
burnup is 66.1 MWD/kg and the local peak fuel discharge
burnup is 104.7 MWD/kg. The peak linear power is evaluated
to be 323.7 W/cm.Secondary control rod
Primary control rod
Reflector
B4C shield
6
3
90
102
Outer core F.A. 60
Inner core F.A. 52
313
sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) core.
Table 3 e Major design parameters of Prototype Gen IV
sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) uranium equilibrium
core.
Core thermal power (MWt) 392.2
Electrical output (MWe) 150
Core inlet/outlet temperature (C) 390/545
Fuel type U-10% Zr
Fuel pin outer diameter (mm) 7.4
Fuel pins per fuel subassembly 217
Fuel pin pitch to diameter ratio 1.14
Fuel assembly pitch (mm) 13.54
Fuel cladding material FC92 (ferrite martensitic steel)
Fuel cladding thickness (mm) 0.5
Fuel assembly structure material HT9
Active core height (cm) 90
Fission gas plenum length (cm) 125
Upper/lower reflector length (cm) 50/90
Number of fuel subassemblies,
inner/outer
52/60
Number of batch, inner/outer core 4/5
Table 4 e Performance parameters of uranium
equilibrium core.
U-235 enrichment (wt.%) 19.2
Heavy metal inventory (ton) 7.33
Charged heavy metal amount (ton/cycle) 1.68
Average/peak discharge burnup (MWd/kg) 66.1/104.7
Reactivity swing (pcm) 2,176
Fast neutron flux ( 1015 #/cm2-sec, E > 0.1 MeV) 1.44
Peak fast neutron fluence ( 1023 #/cm2, E > 0.1 MeV) 2.88
Average/peak linear power density (W/cm) 159.7/323.7
Average/peak volumetric power density (W/cm3) 213.4/432.5
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All primary structures, systems, and components are con-
tained in the reactor vessel as shown in Fig. 4. The reactor
vessel has neither penetration nor attachment and is con-
nected to the bottom of the reactor head. The core assemblies
are supported on the grid plate of the inlet plenum which is
again supported on the core support structure. The reactor
vessel is surrounded by the containment vessel with a gap of
200 mm to provide the in-service inspection by using an
electromagnetic acoustic transducer (EMAT) sensor driven by
a remotely operating vehicle. The gap between the reactor and
containment vessels is filled with inert nitrogen gas and is
continuously monitored by diverse sodium leak detectors.
The hot and cold pools are separated by a redan and a sepa-
ration plate. The biological shield structures are located
outside and above the core to maintain the integrity of the
major structure against neutron irradiation during the plant
lifetime and to prevent excessive neutron activation of IHTS
sodium in the IHXs.Fig. 3 e Schematic of fuel rodThe reactor head is a single forged thick plate and supports
IHXs, decay heat exchangers (DHXs), and a primary pump.
Thermal shield plates are placed below the reactor head above
the cover gas to lower the reactor head temperature. The
reactor vessel and reactor head are made of Type 316 SS and
the containment vessel is made of 2.25Cr-1Mo.
The IVS cools down the spent fuel during one or two cycles
after discharge from the core inside the reactor vessel. The IVS
is located between the IVS shroud and core barrel outside of
the core. The IVS accommodates about 60 spent fuel sub-
assemblies. The spent fuel inside the IVS is cooled by a natural
circulation of hot pool sodium.
2.4. Heat transport systems
The reactor coolant system and connected systems in the
PGSFR mainly consist of PHTS, IHTS, SGS, SWRPRS, and DHRS
as shown in Fig. 5. Themajor design parameters of the reactor
coolant system are given in Table 5. The PHTS circulates pri-
mary sodium through the reactor core and transports the heat
generated from the core to the IHTS under power operation
and normal shutdown operations. Major components of the
system are four IHXs, two PHTS pumps, and the reactor
structures. Four DHXs of the DHRS are also immersed in the
reactor pool. The reactor vessel is enveloped by the contain-
ment vessel to confine the leakage of primary sodium.
During normal operation, the primary sodium coolant is
circulated inside the reactor vessel. The primary sodium isand fuel subassembly.
Fig. 4 e Layout of reactor assembly. CRDM, control rod driving mechanism; DHX, decay heat exchanger; IHX, intermediate
heat exchanger; IVTM, in-vessel transfer machine; PHTS, primary heat transport system.
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 0 5 9e1 0 7 01064heated as it passes through the core and goes up into the hot
pool. The heated hot pool sodium enters the shell sides of four
IHXs where it delivers core heat to the IHTS and then the
cooled sodium enters the cold pool. The IHTS sodium entering
the tube sides of four IHXs absorbs the heat from the PHTS.
Also, the limited amount of cold pool sodium flows through
the shell sides of four DHXs to prevent freezing of the DHRS
sodium and it returns to the cold pool. Two PHTS pumps
located in the cold pool drive sodium to the core through the
internal pipe connected to pump exits and the inlet plenum.
The PHTS pressure is maintained at a slightly higher than
atmospheric pressure of 0.11 MPa under normal operating
conditions to protect from the ingress of gaseous impurities
into the primary sodium and to provide a sufficiently high
available net positive suction head for the PHTS pump. PHTS
pressure is maintained within the operating range by con-
trolling the pressure of cover gas above the sodium free sur-
face through the use of the primary inert gas purification
system.
Physical arrangements of the PHTS are described as fol-
lows: (1) the PHTS pumps and the IHXs are located symmet-
rically in the annular region between the shielding structure
and the redan and arranged through the separation plate be-
tween hot and cold pools; (2) the DHXs and the IHXs are
located at a higher elevation than the core to remove core
decay heat by natural circulation when all PHTS pumps are
not available; (3) all of the structures and components are
arranged so that the primary flow path is maintained even inthe case of primary sodium leak into the containment vessel.
Inlet windows of IHXs and DHXs are submerged into the pri-
mary sodium even when the primary sodium is leaked into
the gap between the reactor and containment vessels; (4) the
sodium level inside the reactor vessel under all normal and
transient operating conditions is maintained to prevent the
gas entrainment into the IHX and to protect the PHTS pump
from cavitation; (5) cold pool sodium level between the redan
and reactor vessel is lower than the hot pool sodium level.
This level difference comes from the pressure loss through the
shell side of the IHX; (6) the cover gas volume is sized to absorb
pressure transients during all systemoperationmodes; and (7)
the reactor head temperature is controlled below 150C to
protect seal materials by shield plates and the reactor head
cooling system.
Two PHTS pumps circulate the primary sodium. The
pumps are motor-driven centrifugal type mechanical pumps
made of Type 316SS. The flow rate and head of the PHTS pump
are controlled by varying the rotating speed of the pump
impeller. The power of the pump is normally supplied from a
normal power distribution system. All PHTS pumps are
equipped with flywheels for ensuring required coastdown
flow and with oil supplying systems for cooling mechanical
seal.
Four cylindrical-shaped IHXs are installed in the PHTS
along with two primary pumps. The IHXs are sized such that
heat produced in the reactor core can be suitably transferred
to the sodium coolant in the IHTS for all operation modes
Fig. 5 e Heat balance of Prototype Gen IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) main heat transport system. IHTS, intermediate
heat transport system; EM, electro-magnetic; PCS, power conversion system; PHTS, primary heat transport system; SG,
steam generator; TBN, turbine.
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is made of 9Cr-1Mo-V material and consists of shell-and-tube
type heat exchangers with a counter-current flow heat
exchanging mechanism. The unit has a vertical orientation
inside the reactor vessel, and its design arrangement properly
provides downward and upward flow of the primary and in-
termediate sodium, respectively. The IHX component is
vertically supported on the reactor closure head with IHX
support flange structure.
The IHTS is composed of two loops, each loop of which
mainly consists of two IHXs, one electromagnetic pump, oneTable 5 e Design parameter of Prototype Gen IV sodium
cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) reactor heat transport system.
Mass flow rate of PHTS (kg/sec) 1,989
Total sodium inventory of PHTS (ton) 538
Volume of PHTS cover gas (m3) 87.2
Hot/cold loop temperature of IHTS (C) 528/322
Mass flow rate of IHTS (kg/sec) 1,497
Steam/feedwater temperature of SG (C) 503/230
Steam/feedwater pressure of SG (MPa) 16.7/19.7
Feedwater flow rate of SG (kg/sec) 171.4
Number of PHTS pumps 2
Number of IHXs 4
Number of IHTS pumps 2
Number of SGs 2
IHX, intermediate heat exchanger; PHTS, primary heat transport
system; SG, steam generator.expansion tank, and one SG. The IHTS pipes are connected to
the sodium drain piping, SWRPRS, and sodium and gas sup-
ply and purification systems. The IHTS pump is an annular
linear induction pump which is located at the cold leg piping
of IHTS. The IHTS is designed to maintain its integrity under
the temperature rise and pressure loading when a sodium-
water reaction occurs in the SG. The five double ended guil-
lotine ruptures of SG tubes are used as a design basis of IHTS.
The portion of the IHTS loop pipe within the containment
boundary is surrounded by a guard pipe which precludes the
sodium leak inside the containment. The cover gas pressure
of the IHTS expansion tank ismaintained slightly higher than
that of the PHTS under normal operating conditions.
Accordingly, radioactive primary sodium does not leak into
the IHTS even in case of the IHX tube leak. The IHTS pipe is
sloped from the IHX upward to the SG for a smooth draining
of the IHTS sodium. The IHTS pipe layout is also designed to
accommodate the thermal expansion of components and
pipes.
At the early stage of the PGSFR conceptual design, a num-
ber of SG typeswere investigated in terms of design feasibility.
For example, helical coil type tube bundle and double-wall
tube bundle SGs were considered. The SG design has been
determined as an integrated once-through and monolithic
type with a straight single wall tube, taking into account a
fabrication capability and scalability to the commercial
application. Orifices are provided in each tube to prevent the
flow instability in the SG tube side where two-phase steam-
water flow exits during normal operating conditions.
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accomplished by using condenser cooling with an SG feed
water system and safety-grade DHRS. During the scheduled
plant shutdown, the reactor core heat is removed through the
heat transport path of the PHTS, IHTS, and the main
condenser cooling of SG systems. However, when the normal
heat transport path is not available, the safety-grade DHRSs
start their operation to remove the system heat load imposed
by the temperature transient of the reactor coolant system.
The safety-grade DHRS consists of four trains to satisfy the
independent and diverse system requirements. Two trains of
the DHRS are the PDHRSs and the other two trains are the
ADHRSs. Heat removal capacity of DHRS is 2.5% of the rated
thermal power. Only with two trains of the DHRS can the core
decay heat be properly removed during a design basis accident
condition. Fig. 6 shows the layout of the reactor assembly,
IHTS, and DHRS.
The safety-grade PDHRS system comprises independent
two heat removal loops. Each loop is equipped with a single
DHX, a single natural-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger
(AHX), main sodium pipes connecting DHX with AHX, an
expansion tank, an air damper, and related instrumentation.
The PDHRS employs a completely passive mechanism
without any provision of active components in the AHX shell-
side air path. This passive feature has superiority from the
aspect that an operational reliance of decay heat removal
system can be secured by removing any operator action. The
DHX is a shell-and-tube type counter-current flow sodium-to-
sodiumheat exchanger. The DHX is immersed in the cold pool
which makes the flow path for decay heat removal simpler
and removes the concern of overcooling of the hot pool. The
AHX is a shell-and-tube type counter-current flow heat
exchanger with a helically coiled tube arrangement. Liquid
sodium flows inside the heat transfer tubes and atmospheric
air flows over the helical tubes.
The safety-grade ADHRS comprises independent two heat
removal loops. Each loop is equippedwith a singleDHX, a single
forced-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger (FHX), the main so-
dium pipes connecting DHX with FHX, an expansion tank, an
electromagnetic pump, an air damper, and an air blower. The
ADHRS employs a similar heat removal path with that of the
PDHRS, but it is designed to be operated by using forced sodium
circulation and forced-draft air flow. The ADHRS is also oper-
ated in passive mode against a loss of power supply, in which
case its heat removal capacity ismore than50%that of the rated
value. This mode is very similar to the passive mode of the
PDHRS, which is surely possible by using the density difference
attained from the geometrical elevation difference of the ther-
mal centers between the DHX and FHX. The FHX is a shell-and-
tube type counter-current flow heat exchanger with a serpen-
tine finned-tube arrangement. During normal operating con-
ditions, thedampers in the PDHRSsand theADHRSsare slightly
opened to prevent a reverse flow in the DHRS loops.
The SWRPRS is provided to protect the IHTS against
excessive pressure which might be caused by sodium-water
reaction in the SG. It is designed to discharge the rapidly
increasing sodium water reaction products and to relieve the
IHTS pressure from a large sodium-water reaction in the SG.
The SWRPRS consists of a sodium dump tank, a liquid-gas
separator, a rupture disc, a backpressure rupture disc, andconnecting pipes. The rupture discs are installed at the SG
inlet and outlet pipes. Excessive pressure in the IHTS and SG
makes the rupture disc burst, and then sodium coolant and
SWR byproducts are dumped into the sodium dump tank.
Gaseous reaction products and entrained sodium are directed
to the liquid-gas separator to remove a liquid reaction product
and sodium. The gaseous products are then discharged to the
stack where a hydrogen igniter is installed.
2.5. In-vessel fuel handling
Since the sodium coolant is opaque and the reactor head
cannot be opened during the refueling, in-vessel fuel handling
is remotely operated by an in-vessel transfer machine (IVTM).
The IVTM is installed to the single rotating plug located at the
reactor head. The driving motor of the IVTM is installed above
the reactor head and the pantograph-type gripper devices are
moved inside the reactor vessel as shown in Fig. 7. Rotational
motion is provided by the single rotating plug movement and
the pantograph arm is extended or contracted, which enables
it to handle all the subassemblies in the core.
The subassemblies will be transferred to the ex-vessel
transfer machine (EVTM) cask through the fuel transport
port (FTP). The FTP is a cylindrical structure fixed to the
reactor head. The upper part of the FTP is connected to the
EVTM by a flange and the bottom part is partially opened to
accommodate the subassembly. The EVTM has a capacity of
three subassemblies and moves it to a fuel handling building
outside the reactor building.3. Safety characteristics of the PGSFR
3.1. Inherent safety characteristics
The SFR has been considered as one of the most promising
candidates for the Generation IV reactor system to achieve
four technology goals of sustainability, enhanced safety and
reliability, economic competitiveness, and proliferation
resistance. The PGSFR has been designed to demonstrate the
key technologies that satisfy the technology goals including
the demonstration of the TRU burning capability recycled
from the LWRs.
The safety principle of the PGSFR is a defense-in-depth phi-
losophy as of the conventional nuclear power plant, but
reflecting emphasized concern on the severe accident after the
Fukushima daiichi accident. The safety design approach of the
PGSFR has been concentrated on the prevention of a severe ac-
cident and additional designmeasures are separately prepared
to mitigate the severe accident. This can be achieved by maxi-
mizing the inherent and passive safety features of the plant.
The safety advantages of the PGSFR come from its basic
design features of sodium coolant, pool type PHTS arrange-
ment, and use of metal fuel [6]. The sodium coolant has a high
boiling point of 883C at atmospheric pressure, which pro-
vides a large boiling margin more than 330C from the normal
operating temperature of 545C. The PGSFR is a pool type and
is operated at about atmospheric pressure. This could elimi-
nate the possibility of large pressure release accidents caused
by a primary pipe break and the need of high pressure
Fig. 6 e Arrangement of intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) and decay heat removal system (DHRS). ADHRS, active
decay heat removal system; AHX, natural-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger; FHX, forced-draft sodium-to-air heat
exchanger; PDHRS, passive decay heat removal system; SG, steam generator; SWRPRS; sodium-water reaction pressure
relief system.
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provides the possibility of low design pressure of contain-
ment. The large amount of the sodium coolant within the
reactor vessel plays a role of a large thermal heat sink at an
early stage of the accident, whichmakes the thermal transient
of the system tardy andmild. The large temperature rise in the
core and PHTS enables bringing about more negative reac-
tivity feedback by thermal expansion to enhance the passive
decay heat cooling driven by natural circulation during laterstages of the accident. The sodium coolant is chemically
compatible with the steel material especially against corro-
sion, which ensures the long-term reliable operation of the
structures and components submerged in sodium.
One of the key inherent safety features comes from fuel
material. Performance of metal fuel during normal and acci-
dent conditions is supported by intrinsic thermal,mechanical,
and neutronics properties. Metal fuel has a much higher
thermal conductivity than that of oxide fuel, which implies a
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Fig. 7 e Design drawing of in-vessel transfer machine.
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The fuel temperature is about 700C during the normal oper-
ation, which is relatively close to the hot shutdown condition
of 351C. The small temperature gradient across the fuel
radius and the relatively low operating temperature results in
a smaller Doppler reactivity variation and consequently a
reduced amount of control reactivity requirements. Thanks to
the Doppler reactivity feedback of the fastest component
among reactivity components, the reactivity and thermal
transients become mild and slow, which leads to a longer
grace period for operator action if needed. The low fuel tem-
perature during the normal operation also provides a suffi-
cient power-to-meltmargin to the fuelmelting temperature of
about 1,250C.
The fast neutron spectrum could eliminate the concern
about the reactivity and power oscillation resulting from the
variation of xenon and samarium concentrations in LWRs.
Those neutron cross sections in the fast neutron energy regionare much lower than in LWRs and do not contribute signifi-
cantly to the reactivity and core power.
However, the fast neutron system has technical challenges
on a recriticality issues. Because the fast reactor cores are not
in their most reactive configuration, the design must ensure
that the recriticality does not occur and consequently a large
amount of mechanical energy is not released during a postu-
lated accident. In the fast neutron system, a compaction of
core or fissilematerial leads to the recriticality conditions. The
other technical challenge is to ensure the core coolable ge-
ometry, even in a severe accident situation.
Metal fuel is chemically compatible with the sodium
coolant, as sodium is initially filled betweenmetal fuel slug and
cladding. Amelting temperature of themetal fuel is lower than
that of cladding material. This means that the fuel melts prior
to the melting of cladding. Molten metal fuel greatly expands
by a phase change inside the cladding or the cladding will be
breached by eutectic penetration and overpressure in the gas
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column, at the highest temperature of coolant and cladding.
The volumetric expansion of the fuel imposes the negative
reactivity to the core. Meanwhile, the molten fuel released
after the cladding failure does not solidify or block the coolant
channel and is swept out from the core. This phenomenon also
imposes the negative reactivity. The resolidified molten fuel
debris is highly porous, which provides the coolability poten-
tial by natural circulation and heat conduction. This molten
fuel motion was demonstrated in transient overpower tests at
Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) [7] and the fragmen-
tation phenomena of molten fuel were tested through the in-
jection of molten uranium metal into sodium [8,9].
In addition to the chemical and mechanical benefits, metal
fuel is also favorable from the neutronics point of view, due to
its inherently negative reactivity feedback. Axial and radial
expansions of the fuel and the core impose negative reactivity
when the core temperature is increased. Also, the smaller
Doppler reactivity feedback effect of metal fuel is more favor-
able than oxide fuel, due to a significantly lower fuel operating
temperature. The ability of these reactivity feedback effects to
successfully reduce the core power during unprotected tran-
sients without scram was demonstrated in EBR-II tests [10].
The PGSFR has five physical barriers against the release of
radionuclides during accidents: (1) fuel matrix; (2) cladding; (3)
primary sodium coolant; (4) reactor coolant boundary; and (5)
containment. The uses of metal fuel and sodium coolant make
the transport behaviors of radionuclides much different from
those of LWRs. The main differences lay on the behavior of
iodine and cesium in themetal fuel and sodium.The iodine and
cesium make a compound of CsI within the fuel matrix and
transfer to the sodium bond. When the CsI reaches the sodium
bond, it decomposes toCs and a very stableNaI. The iodine also
makes a compoundwith uraniummetal as a form of UI3 which
can be separated from the fuel matrix only at very high tem-
perature. The vaporization of NaI is known as less than that of
sodium coolant. Then, the release of radioactive iodine outside
the primary coolant boundary is a very low possibility. The ce-
sium is dissolved into the primary sodium coolant. Although
the vapor pressure of the cesium is higher than that of sodium,
only a limited amount of cesium is gathered in the cover gas
region due to repeated vaporization and condensation between
the sodium free surface level and cover gas [11].
3.2. Passive safety features
The safetyadvantage fromthe inherent safety characteristics is
strengthened by passive safety features employed in the PGSFR
design. The reactor shutdown is ensured by the inherent
negative reactivity feedback, two independent and diversified
reactor shutdown systems, and a passive shutdown system.
The passive shutdown system provides an additional margin
against a common cause failure of the reactor shutdown sys-
tem, although the current PGSFR design satisfies the safety
limits even in case of anticipated transient without scram. The
passive shutdown system utilizes thermal expansion and is
automatically actuated by a temperature rise of hot pool so-
diumabove the core.When the hot pool temperature increases
to the specific point, the control rod assemblies are automati-
cally detached from the electromagnet by thermal expansionand are dropped into the core by gravity. The passive shutdown
system is implemented in the secondary control system.
Almost fully passive DHRSs ensure a highly reliable opera-
tion of the decay heat removal in addition to the intrinsic safety
characteristics of a pool-typemetal-fueled SFR. The core decay
heat can be rejected to the ultimate heat sink (atmosphere)
during an extended period only with the passive DHRS using
natural circulation without internal and external power sup-
plies. This leads to simpler decay heat removal operation and
accidentmanagement allowing a long graceperiod for operator
action and a longer coping time against the station black out.
In addition to the safety-grade DHRS, the reactor vault
cooling system (RVCS), which is normally operated for
cooling the concrete vault support, provides additional
design measures during a severe accident. The RVCS is an
ex-vessel cooling system using natural circulation of atmo-
sphere and sufficiently sized to cool down molten fuel debris
inside the reactor vessel when the safety-grade DHRS is not
available.4. R&D activities and works in progress
In order to support and demonstrate the safety performance
of the PGSFR design, verification and validation activities are
being performed in parallel with the design progress. A large-
scale sodium thermal hydraulic test program called STELLA
is being progressed in 2016. As the first step of the program,
the sodium component tests of the PDHRS called STELLA-1
has been completed, the data obtained from which are to
be used for validating computer codes for thermal sizing and
system transient analysis of the PDHRS components. As the
second step, an integral effect test loop called STELLA-2 has
been started to demonstrate the plant safety and to support
the PGSFR design certification. The integral test loop is to
demonstrate the safety performance of the DHRS and RVCS
in conjunction with the PHTS. The basic design of the
STELLA-2 facility was already completed in 2015 and the
detailed design is being carried out in 2016. The construction
of STELLA-2 is scheduled by the end of 2018 and the
demonstration of the integral effect test will be completed in
the middle of 2020.
Various R&D activities are being performed, including
verification and validation of computational codes and
development of the metal fuel fabrication technology. The
reactor mock-up physics experiment in the BFS facility was
completed in 2015 in collaboration with Institute of Physics
and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Russia. The validation of
neutronics codes against themock-up tests will be completed
in 2016. All of the validation activities on reactor physics will
be gathered and consolidated in the topical report to be is-
sued at the end of 2017. Regarding the metal fuel fabrication
technology, all parts of the fuel subassembly, fuel slug,
advanced cladding, wire, and duct have been manufactured
and are to be tested. The irradiation test of advanced cladding
(FC92) was started at the BOR-60 experimental fast reactor in
2014 and its first interim inspection was completed in the
middle of 2016. The test fuel rods were successfully fabri-
cated in 2015 and their irradiation tests started in BOR-60
from June 2016.
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Based on the experiences gained through the development of
past KALIMER designs, the KAERI is developing the PGSFR
design that can better meet the Gen IV technology goals and
the technologies necessary for its early demonstration, with
the aim of burning transuranics included in LWR SNF. Several
advanced design concepts were developed to improve the
economics, safety assurance, and metal fuel performance of
SFR in the areas of reactor core, fuel and materials, reactor
systems, and the balance-of-plant. The PGSFR has a plant
capacity of 150 MWe. The NSSS consists of a pool type PHTS,
two IHTS loops, a superheated steam Rankine cycle conver-
sion system, and integrated once-through single-wall straight
tube type SGs.
The safety design of the PGSFR emphasizes accident pre-
vention by enhancing inherent safety characteristics and
passive safety features using natural phenomena. The safety-
grade DHRS has been implemented into the design while
meeting the requirements of redundancy and diversity, which
enables rejection of core decay heat only with passive design
features. The passive design is also employed into the reactor
shutdown system using thermal expansion.
To support the development of the PGSFR design and
technologies, R&D activities are being performed for various
topics including the validation of neutronics analysis codes,
safety demonstration of DHRS in conjunction with primary
systems, sodium technology development, and metal fuel
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